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Railway (de-)regulation in the context of EU trans-
port market liberalisation
Since the European Court of Justice ruled against the
Council of Transport Ministers in 1985 for failing to
ensure freedom to provide services in the sphere of
international transport, the paradigm shift towards
full competition on the European transport markets
has become irreversible. The European Union has
played a leading role in this process, and the benefits
of free entry to transport markets throughout Eu-
rope are now largely unchallenged.
The transportation of persons or goods on roads,
railways, waterways, and in the air, seems at first
glance very heterogeneous. Nevertheless, the differ-
ent transportation modes share as a common deno-
minator the existence of an infrastructure of routes,
of traffic control systems as well as vehicles to pro-
vide transportation services. For example, railroads
are technical systems which can be divided into the
following related parts:
– Tracks and stations (construction and mainte-
nance);
– Train traffic control systems (scheduling and op-
erating);
– Train services (transportation of goods and pas-
sengers).
There are obviously strong complementarities be-
tween the different parts of railroad systems. Train
services can only be provided if access to tracks and
stations is guaranteed and the operation of trains is
coordinated, including ex ante scheduling as well as
real time train control.These synergies have created
the fable of vertical integration as the adequate or-
ganisational form of railroad systems. Lessons from
the history of the nineteenth century that it might be
more effective to organise railroad systems in a rath-
er disaggregated way have been widely ignored.1It is
by now well known that third-party access to rail-
ways is indeed technically feasible. Indeed, the pro-
cess of regulatory reform during the last decade would
otherwise have been pointless.
The disaster of reduced traffic and increased deficits
of European railroad companies has led to a chal-
lenge of the vertical integration approach. The prin-
ciples of non-discriminatory access charges to rail-
way infrastructures were already laid down in the
Council Directive 91/440/EEC
2 of July 1991 as the
precondition for the competitive supply of railway
services on the same track.Free entry of service com-
panies should improve the quality and variety of
train services as well as provide incentives for a more
cost-efficient production of train services.Vertical in-
tegration is no longer considered to be the adequate
organisational form of railway systems. Instead, EU
policy has been to separate the supply of train ser-
vices from the provision of infrastructure, separation
of accounts being compulsory and organisational or
institutional separation being optional. In the Coun-
cil Directive 95/19/EC of 19 June 1995 the basic prin-
ciples of infrastructure allocation were established
on the Community level.3 These principles do not al-
low discrimination between national and internation-
al services, discrimination between different users of
railway infrastructure and excessively high access
charges.The design of the non-discriminatory alloca-
tion of track capacities,however,remained within the
competence of the member countries. In particular,
market power regulation has not been prescribed by
the EU Directives.
Efficient competition on European rail transport
markets is conditional upon the existence of non-dis-
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fees, OJ L143/75, 27.06.1995.criminatory access to rail infrastructure for all active
and potential train service providers. In addition,
however, efforts must also be made to ensure that
scant infrastructure capacities are allocated efficient-
ly and total costs of rail infrastructure are covered.
The German railroad reform
On 1 January 1994, the railway reform legal package
was enacted.The transition from a public enterprise to
a firm under private law in the form of a joint stock
company can only be called formal privatisation (rath-
er than a real privatisation by sale of publicly owned
assets), because the state is still the sole owner of the
Deutsche Bahn AG (Group). Separate branches for
infrastructure (DB Netz AG), commodity transporta-
tion (DB Transport und Logistik), passenger long-dis-
tance transportation and passenger local transport-
ation were founded. Financial reasons also played a
non-negligible role for the privatisation initiative.The
Deutsche Bundesbahn and the Deutsche Reichsbahn,
its counterpart in East Germany, suffered from large
amounts of debts. The first step of the privatisation
thus consisted of the relief of the liquidation of debts
and the endowment with new capital.
There has been an intense controversy over the issue
of separating railway infrastructure from railway ser-
vices and not only formally privatising the service
companies of the Deutsche Bahn AG (Group) (Knieps
1996, 44;Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesmini-
sterium für Verkehr 1997, 632). Such a real separa-
tion, however, has not taken place so far. Until now,
German railways have only been formally privatised.
Deutsche Bahn AG (Group) is the only shareholder
of the subsidiaries mentioned here. The Federal Re-
public of Germany has so far remained the only share-
holder of Deutsche Bahn AG (Group). Since private
capital can only be raised if risk-equivalent interest
rates can be expected, privatisation shifted public at-
tention to the cost-covering possibilities of access
charges to the rail infrastructure.
A major goal of the German railroad reform has
been entry deregulation of train services in the con-
text of the liberalisation of European transportation
markets.Accounting separation between service lev-
el and infrastructure level was considered a neces-
sary precondition to guarantee non-discriminatory
access to the tracks for all providers of train services.
The DB Netz AG is obliged to provide access to the
service providers’ tracks on a non-discriminatory ba-
sis.Access charges have to be paid by all users of the
infrastructure. To cover the gap between revenues
from track access charges and total costs, the State
contributes to the financing of the infrastructure.
First phase of (de-)regulation: Negotiated third 
party access 
If the track owner no longer supplies all transporta-
tion services himself,it is vital to distinguish between
the service tariff the customers have to pay to the
transportation firm and the access charge the trans-
portation firm has to pay to the track owner.Accord-
ing to the well-established subsidiary principle, in
Europe only the basic principles of infrastructure al-
location were established on the community level.
These principles do not allow discrimination be-
tween national and international services, discrimi-
nation between different users of railway infrastruc-
ture or excessively high access charges.The detailed
design of non-discriminatory allocation of track ca-
pacities, however, remained within the competence
of the member countries.
The first phase of German railway (de-)regulation has
been characterised by the requirement of non-dis-
criminatory third party access without ex ante sector-
specific regulation.According to the General Railway
Act (AEG), §14, all railway companies located in
Germany have the right of non-discriminatory access
to railway infrastructures, irrespective of the kind of
rail transport they offer. The design of three subse-
quent access charge systems as well as the allocation
of track capacities was left within the competency of
DB Netz AG. The newly founded Federal Railway
Administration was in particular responsible for tech-
nical regulations, whereas the competency for issues
of access discrimination was increasingly handed over
to the Federal Cartel Office. The basic concept was
based on negotiations between applicants and the DB
Netz AG in its function as infrastructure manager.
There was no ex ante regulation of access charges.
The access charges of the DB Netz AG were factual-
ly unregulated.The Federal Railway Administration
was only responsible for settling conflicts between
the DB Netz AG and third parties arising in the con-
text of access conditions and access charges. Earlier
criticism of the access charges policy of the DB Netz
AG already indicated that the overall level of the ac-
cess charges would be too high, in particular due to
the overload of employees at the Deutsche Bahn AG
(Group) (Aberle and Brenner 1994, 707 f.).
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DB Netz AG issued its first access pricing system on 
1 July 1994,consisting of separate catalogues of prices
and conditions for access to its tracks for passenger
transport and for freight transport. Its major charac-
teristics were quantity rebates, based on the total
amount of train kilometres undertaken on the track
network of DB Netz AG. Its successor, the second ac-
cess pricing system (TPS 1998) was issued by DB Netz
AG in June 1998. This revised rail track tariff system
featured a two-tier level of charges. After obtaining
an “InfraCard”, the track user was charged a lower
variable price or,on the other hand,without using this
card,he was charged higher rates according to the ac-
tual services made use of.Within each demand group,
rail track users were treated on equal terms. In the
case of capacity constraints arising from the sheer vol-
ume of rail track usage,customers using “InfraCards”
or the “VarioPreis” (variable charges system) were
treated equally. The third access pricing system (TPS
2001), issued by DB Netz AG in 2001, was charac-
terised by a linear tariff without volume discounts or
optional “InfraCard”. Instead, elements of product
differentiation in the form of different categories of
track capacities are offered.
So far, revisions of the access charge systems of the
DB Netz AG only seem to occur in reaction to pub-
lic debate. In particular, the argument that quantity
discounts or non-linear tariffs would unilaterally fa-
vour the position of Deutsche Bahn AG (Group) as
the dominant supplier of rail transportation services
and conditions of equal access to the tracks would
therefore be disturbed has led to the introduction of
linear access charges, which are obviously inade-
quate to attract more traffic to the railway systems
(Knieps 1998, 466 f.)
Active competition on the German railroad market is
focused on commodity transportation within Ger-
many as well as on local passenger transportation.
Entry into cross-border transportation can rarely be
observed; cabotage on foreign networks within other
EU countries is almost nonexistent. Competitive bid-
ding for subsidies for local passenger transportation
takes place only to a limited extent (Aberle and Eisen-
kopf 2002, 68).
Deutsche Bahn AG (Group) is the largest provider
of rail services in Germany.Based on mileage,by the
end of 2003 its market share was 91 percent for local
and regional passenger services, more than 99 per-
cent for commercial long distance and interregional
passenger services, and 94 percent for freight ser-
vices (NEA 2005, 13).4
Since the reform of the railway sector there has been
almost no entry of commercial long-distance and in-
terregional passenger operators in the German rail
market. Few examples are: two lines with low fre-
quency run by Connex (“InterConnex”) and one in-
ternational night train run by GVG.The market share
of the competitors of Deutsche Bahn AG (Group) 
in non-commercial passenger services was less than 
10 percent in 2003, including direct awards to feder-
al state owned railway companies.
More entry can be observed in the German rail
freight market. Although Railion (former DB Car-
go) is still the dominant operator for freight (>91 per-
cent in 2003),there are other private operators emer-
ging in specific freight markets.The four largest long-
distance providers are Railion (Stinnes-Logistics/
Deutsche Bahn Group),TX Logistics,HGK/SBB Car-
go (Co-operation), and Rail4Chem. In passenger op-
erations the four largest are DB Regio AG, DB Reise
&Touristik AG, Arriva Deutschland GmbH, and
Connex Regiobahn GmbH (Connex Group) (NEA
2005, 13, 37).
The second phase of (de-)regulation: Introduction
of market power regulation
The shift again towards market power regulation of
rail access, which was initiated by the EU Directive
2001/14 of the railroad infrastructure package5 of
February 2001, introduces several regulatory obliga-
tions for the provider of track access and requires a
regulatory body to be set up in each member state.
In Germany, a new regulatory authority, the Federal
Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) has been es-
tablished. It is responsible for sector-specific regula-
tion for the telecommunications and postal sector,
the electricity and gas sector, and the railway sector.
According to article 3, detailed statements of the in-
frastructure provider are required, including details
of the charging system and the principles and criteria
4 Similar figures are also presented in Lindemann (2004, 122).
5 The Rail Infrastructure Package contains 3 Directives: Directive
2001/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26
February 2001 amending Council Directive 91/440/EEC on the de-
velopment of the Community’s railways, OJ L75/1, 15 March 2001;
Directive 2001/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 February 2001 amending Council Directive 95/18/EC
on the licensing of railway undertakings, OJ L 75/26, 15 March
2001; Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 February 2001 on the allocation of railway infra-
structure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway
infrastructure and safety certification, OJ L 75/29, 15 March 2001.for capacity allocation (Annex I).Train service com-
panies have the right to appeal to the regulatory
agency against decisions of the track provider (Art.
30). The railroad package neither prescribes tariff
structures nor enforces price regulations. It leaves a
large scope of discretionary power to the regulatory
agencies of the member countries.
In the meantime a new Infrastructure Utilisation
Regulation has been passed in Germany.6 Based on
the new EU Directives, a set of detailed require-
ments has been specified in order to improve the
transparency of the principles and criteria for the al-
location of track capacities as well as the principles
of access tariffs.Negotiations concerning the level of
infrastructure charges will in the future only be per-
mitted if they are carried out under the supervision
of this regulatory body.
During the first phase of (de-)regulation the debate
on access charging seemed to neglect the remaining
regulatory problems.An essential characteristic with
respect to the supply of train services is its network
structure. Incentives may exist for train companies
for bundling traffic either on a given line (economies
of scale) or in serving several lines jointly (econo-
mies of scope).Nevertheless,if in a particularly sparse-
ly populated area there is a lack of competition be-
tween active firms in the market, this may be re-
placed by efficient potential competition. The pres-
sure of potential competition is sufficient to create
incentives for the active supplier of train services to
produce more efficiently.Thus the actual number of
active competitors is of negligible relevance, as long
as potential entrants can play the role of disciplining
the active providers.Therefore, the condition for the
functioning of potential competition for disciplining
firms already in the market is that the incumbent
firms do not have asymmetric cost-advantages com-
pared to potential entrants. Whereas active and po-
tential competition of transportation firms acting on
the track initiates a trend towards cost-oriented trans-
portation tariffs,railway tracks themselves must be re-
garded as monopolistic bottlenecks.The theory of mo-
nopolistic bottlenecks is central to the disaggregated
regulatory approach in terms of locating network-spe-
cific market power in connection with the efforts to
determine the minimum basis for regulation (Knieps
1997a, 327–31; Knieps 1997b, 362–68).
The conditions for a monopolistic bottleneck facility
are fulfilled
1) If the facility is necessary for reaching consumers,
that is,if no second or third such facility exists,i.e.
if there is no active substitute available.This is the
case if there is,due to economies of scale and eco-
nomies of scope, a natural monopoly situation, so
that one supplier can provide this facility at lower
cost than several suppliers; and
2) If at the same time the facility cannot be duplicat-
ed in an economically feasible way, that is, if no
potential substitute is available.This is the case if
the costs of the facility are irreversible.
The special focus of regulatory activity should be on
the design of a symmetrical regulation of the access
to monopolistic bottlenecks, combined with a regu-
lation of access charges. Therefore, if a potential
competitor plans an entry with a parallel track, the
incumbent railway owner could reasonably threaten
to reduce his tariffs to the short-run variable costs.
Once a railway network is completed,one cannot ex-
pect further entries with additional tracks.The deci-
sion-relevant costs of entry include the costs of
tracks, which cannot be covered by tariffs based on
short-run variable costs. In contrast to the supplier 
of rail-services, the track owner in question has
therefore obtained market power.Since competition
among lines is lacking, unregulated access charges
create the danger of the track owner exploiting his
monopoly power.
The shift towards sector-specific ex ante regulation
of access to the track seems necessary in order to dis-
cipline the impact of market power on the bargain-
ing for access conditions. In contrast to competitive
networks, the market power involved in network in-
frastructures characterised as monopolistic bottle-
necks fundamentally disturbs such bargaining pro-
cesses. One extreme alternative could be (vertical)
foreclosure of competitors on a complementary ser-
vice market. A tying of this sort can be used as a
method of price discrimination, enabling a monopo-
list to earn higher profits. Another way of abusing
market power within the bargaining process on ac-
cess conditions is to provide insufficient network ac-
cess quality or demand excessive access charges.
An adequate starting point for regulatory interven-
tion when market power is involved in access pro-
cesses seems to be the “essential facility” doctrine.
Well known and often applied in US antitrust law,
the essential facility doctrine gains increasing impor-
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tance also in European competition law. The focus 
is on access to monopolistic bottlenecks on equal
terms for all competitors. It is through the applica-
tion of the 1890 Sherman Act that the essential facil-
ity doctrine has developed in the US.
Liability under the essential facilities doctrine is
based on the following criteria:
1) Control of an essential facility by a monopolist
(endowing monopoly power);
2) A competitor’s inability, in practical or reason-
able terms, to duplicate the facility;
3) The denial of the use of the facility to a competi-
tor; and
4) The feasibility of providing the facility.
In the context of the disaggregated regulatory ap-
proach the essential facilities doctrine is no longer
applied case by case – as is common in US antitrust
law – but to an entire class of cases, namely, monop-
olistic bottleneck facilities. The design of non-dis-
criminatory conditions of access to essential facilities
must be specified in the context of the disaggregated
regulatory approach.
Whereas ex ante regulation of access to railroad
tracks seems necessary, this should, however, not
lead to over-regulation. It is important to differenti-
ate between the price level, which has to be regulat-
ed, and the pricing structure, which must remain un-
regulated. Regulators should neither be allowed to
prescribe pricing roles that focus on tariff structures
within monopolistic bottlenecks nor to forbid per se
the implementation of non-linear tariffs. Price cap
regulation in the monopolistic bottleneck areas and
accounting separation are necessary for disciplining
the remaining market power and ensuring non-dis-
criminatory access.Detailed input regulation contra-
dicts the spirit of a price cap regulation. Not only in
competitive subparts of networks,but also in the mo-
nopolistic bottleneck areas pricing structures should
be flexible und the result of endogenous market
processes.The welfare-increasing effects of price dif-
ferentiation should not be impeded by asymmetrical
regulatory intervention.
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